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From Shame to Game in One Hundred Years: An Economic 
Model of the Rise in Premarital Sex and its De-Stigmatization 
 
Societies socialize children about many things, including sex. Socialization is costly. It uses 
scarce resources, such as time and effort. Parents weigh the marginal gains from 
socialization against its costs. Those at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale indoctrinate 
their daughters less than others about the perils of premarital sex, because the latter will lose 
less from an out-of-wedlock birth. Modern contraceptives have profoundly affected the 
calculus for instilling sexual mores, leading to a de-stigmatization of sex. As contraception 
has become more effective there is less need for parents, churches and states to inculcate 
sexual mores. Technology affects culture. 
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 1. Introduction
Shame is a disease of the last age; this seemeth to be cured of it. Marquis of
Halifax (1633-1695)
The last one hundred years have witnessed a revolution in sexual behavior. In 1900, only
6% of U.S. women would have engaged in premarital sex by age 19￿ see Figure 1 (all data
sources are discussed in the Appendix). Now, 75% have experienced this. Public acceptance
of this practice reacted with delay. Only 15% of women in 1968 had a permissive attitude
toward premarital sex. At the time, though, about 40% of 19 year-old females had experienced
it. The number with a permissive attitude had jumped to 45% by 1983, a time when 73%
of 19 year olds were sexually experienced. Thus, societal attitudes lagged practice. Beyond
the evolution and acceptance of sexual behavior over time, there are relevant cross-sectional
di⁄erences across females. In the U.S., the odds of a girl having premarital sex decline with
family income. So, for instance, in the bottom decile 70% of girls between the ages of 15 and
19 have experienced it, versus 47% in the top one. Similarly, 68% of adolescent girls whose
family income lies in the upper quartile would feel ￿very upset￿if they got pregnant, versus
46% of those whose family income is in the lower quartile. The goal here is to present a
model that can account for the rise in premarital sex, its lagged de-stigmatization, and the
cross-sectional observations about sex and the attitudes towards it.
The idea is that young adults will act in their own best interest when deciding to engage
in premarital sex. They will weigh the bene￿ts from the joy of sex against its cost, the
possibility of having an out-of-wedlock birth. An out-of-wedlock birth has many potential
costs for a young woman: it may reduce her educational and job opportunities; it may hurt
her mating prospects on the marriage market; she may feel shame or stigma. Over time the
odds of becoming pregnant (the failure rate) from premarital sex have declined, due to the
facts that contraception has improved, and more teens are using some method￿ Figure 2. The
cost of engaging in premarital sex fell, as a result. This leads to the paradoxical situation
where, despite the fact that the e¢ cacy of contraception has increased, so has the number of
out-of-wedlock births.
The stigma that a young woman incurs from premarital sex may drop over time too.
Suppose that parents inculcate a proscription on premarital sex into their daughters￿moral
￿bers. As Coleman (1990, p. 295) nicely puts it: ￿the strategy is to change the self and let
the new self decide what is right and what is wrong (for example, by imagining what one￿ s
mother would say about a particular action).￿Parents do this because they want the best for
their daughter. They know that an out-of-wedlock birth will hurt their daughter￿ s welfare.
























Figure 1: Premarital Sex, attitudes and practice
As contraception improves, the need for the proscription diminishes and with it the amount
of parental indoctrination. If the stigma is transmitted over time, however, its reduction will
lag the increase in sexual activities. The same shift in incentives may also change the moral
proscriptions of institutions such as the church and state.
Di⁄erences in the costs of an out-of-wedlock birth also explain the cross-sectional obser-
vations. The desire to socialize will be smaller the less its impact is on a child￿ s future well
being. Therefore, there may be little incentive to socialize children at the bottom of the so-
cioeconomic scale because they have no where to go in life anyway. Similarly, the payo⁄for a
parent to changing his o⁄spring￿ s self is higher the closer and longer the parent￿ s connections
to the child are. Hence, in societies where parents lose contact with their o⁄spring when they
grow up, the incentives to socialize the latter may be attenuated.
These mechanisms will be examined here, both theoretically and quantitatively, by de-
veloping an overlapping generations model where parents invest e⁄ort into the socialization
of their children. The concept of socializing children is operationalized by letting a parent
in￿ uence his o⁄spring￿ s tastes about an out-of-wedlock birth. Doing so incurs a cost in terms
of e⁄ort to the parent. In the model, for simplicity, there is no distinction between direct
and oblique socialization; that is, between socialization within the family and outside the
family￿ Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). This is not a serious drawback and it provides
the needed analytical tractability. Think about a parent￿ s e⁄ort as either being spent directly
on educating his children about sexual mores, or indirectly in selecting and moving into a



















































































Figure 2: E⁄ectiveness in contraception and out-of-wedlock births to teenage girls
neighborhood where the oblique socialization would go in the desired direction.1 After social-
ization, some o⁄spring will engage in sex, resulting in a percentage of out-of-wedlock births,
and others will not. In the following period, there is a matching process in the marriage mar-
ket. The presence of an out-of-wedlock child will diminish the attractiveness of a woman as
a partner. After marriages occur, the new households will produce, consume, and raise and
socialize their own kids (including any previous out-of-wedlock children). Some analytical
results for the model are presented. Then, a steady state for the model is calibrated to match
some stylized facts for today￿ s U.S. economy. After this some transitional dynamics are com-
puted for the situation where society faces a known time path of technological progress in its
contraceptive technology. It is demonstrated that the model can replicate the observed rise
in premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births. Last, illegitimacy is also costly for institutions
such as the church and state, which have typically provided unwed mothers with some form
of charity. A Ramsey-style problem is brie￿ y considered where the church and state tries to
in￿ uence attitudes in order to minimize the number of out-of-wedlock births net of the cost
of socialization.
Before proceeding onto a more detailed exploration of the historical evidence, the inves-
1The previous argument should not be interpreted as a negation of the importance of peer group e⁄ects
that the empirical literature has documented extensively, see Manski (2000). The emphasis here is the ability
of parents to control, to some extent and at a cost, the peers of their children. Furthermore, there may ￿social
multiplier￿e⁄ects created by individual interaction that are ignored here; e.g., Glaeser et al. (2003) .
4tigation should be framed within the literature on modelling the purposeful transmission of
preferences, beliefs, and norms using economic models.2 The modern analysis of how to af-
fect a child￿ s preferences through parental investments starts with Becker (1993), who was
undoubtedly in￿ uenced by the work of Coleman (1990). He explored how parents may predis-
pose childrens￿preferences toward providing them with old age support. Becker and Mulligan
(1997) focus on the manipulation of the child￿ s rate of time preference. This idea is extended
in Doepke and Zilibotti￿ s (2008) work on the decline of the aristocracy that accompanied
the British Industrial Revolution. They argue that parents, who thought that their children
might enter the class of skilled workers, instilled in their o⁄spring a patience that allowed
their child to sacri￿ce today in order to acquire the human capital necessary so that they
would earn more tomorrow.3
The current work builds on the preference transmission literature by emphasizing how
technological innovation induces changes in the socialization decisions of parents through
shifts in incentives. Parents￿decisions become an ampli￿cation mechanism of the original
technological shocks. The paper can be read, in part, as an example of this type of am-
pli￿cation mechanism. Other examples are the shifts in investments that parents make in
promoting the patience, self-discipline, religiosity, ethnic or national identi￿cation, or cultural
appreciation when the economic environment changes. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on
how endogenous socialization generates a lag between behavior and societal attitudes. In
such a way, a mechanism is built that formalizes the insights of Ogburn (1964) regarding the
existence of a lag between technology and cultural change. Greenwood and Guner (forth.)
also study the impact that technological advance in contraception has had on social behavior
and interaction. They build an equilibrium matching model where youths make decisions
about which social groups (either abstinent or promiscuous ones) to circulate within. The
group they mix with will depend both on the state of contraceptive technology and on what
others are doing. They de￿ne social change simply as shifts in the relative sizes of these social
groups, which re￿ ect the aggregation of decentrialized decision making at the individual level.
The emphasis here is very di⁄erent: the spotlight is on the role that parents, and institutions,
2There is also a growing literature on evolutionary models of preferences transmission. [See Barkow et
al. (1992) for an Evolutionary Psychology perspective, and Robson and Samuelson (forth) for a survey in
Economics.] Similarly, Durham (1992) explores the coevolution of genetic traits with endogenous socialization.
While those mechanisms are clearly relevant in the long run, the time frame of the sexual changes focused on
here, around a century, excludes a large role for evolution in the observed variations of behavior.
3Bisin and Verdier (2001), and a number of following papers, approach the problem of preferences trans-
mission from a di⁄erent perspective: parents want children to behave like them [see Bisin and Verdier (2008)
for a short summary of the existing knowledge]. Under this assumption, they analyze the evolution of the
distribution of traits in the population and how the incentives of parents regarding the level of socialization
invested in their children evolve depending on the aggregate distribution of traits.
5play in shaping their children￿ s sexual mores, and therefore their behavior, and on the lags
between this behavior and societal acceptance.
Finally, there is a large empirical literature relating culture and economic behavior that
is too wide to survey here. Guiso et al. (2006) provide a nice summary of many of the issues
studied by economists over the last few years. Of particular interest is the evidence regarding
the e⁄ect of ￿ethnic capital￿as documented by Borjas (1992), FernÆndez and Fogli (2009),
and Guiliano (2007). The current analysis can be used to interpret this evidence as the result
of the persistence in parents￿decisions induced by the role that socialization plays as a state
variable; i.e., the action of a youth today is in￿ uenced by the socialization she or he received
from her or his parents, which in turn is a⁄ected by the socialization they experienced from
their parents.
2. Historical Discussion
Every lewd woman which have any bastard which may be chargeable to the parish,
the justices of the peace shall commit such women to the house of correction, to
be punished and set on work during the term of one whole year. Statute of 7
James, cap 4 (1610).4
Widespread participation in premarital sex is a recent phenomena in Western societies.
In yesteryear only a small fraction of women must have entertained it.5 This can be inferred
from Figure 3, which plots the number of out-of-wedlock births for England and Wales from
1580 to 2004. The experience for other Western European countries is similar. Therborn
(2004, p. 149) reports that the percentage of children born out of wedlock among live births
around 1896-1900 was 6% in Australia, 8% in Belgium, 9% in Germany, 6% in Italy, 4%
in New Zealand, 3% in the Netherlands, 2% in Ontario (Canada), 5% in Spain, and 5% in
Switzerland. Furthermore, prenuptial conception (i.e., births happening less than 9 months
after the wedding) was relatively low.6
4As quoted by MacFarlane (1980, p. 73).
5The case for men might be di⁄erent since prostitution was a rather common practice in Western societies￿
Therborn (2004).
6In some pockets of Western Europe prenuptial conception was higher during the 16th to 18th centuries.
This observation must be handled with care, however. In the traditional European marriage pattern, there
was a betrothal and a formal wedding, often with a non-trivial amount of time between the two. Betrothal was
a serious a⁄air. It was a legally binding contract. It established the really important things back then: who
would get what. The courts enforced these contracts by imposing serious penalties on those who broke them.
Although the Church was adamantly opposed to it, the practice in rural Europe was often to look the other
way from the sex of the soon-to-be married couples. [Many peasants thought that they were married after
the betrothal. See for example, the description in Godbeer (2002, p. 3)]. Therefore, prenuptial conceptions





























































Figure 3: The percentage of all births that are out-of-wedlock from 1580-2004 and the gross
reproductive rate 1540-2000, both for England and Wales
Given the primitive state of contraception, the small number of out-of-wedlock births is
only consistent with a small fraction of the population engaging in premarital sex, especially
because some women might have had more than one such birth and because a substantial
fraction of those births came from long-lasting cohabitating couples that for some reason or
another had not formalized their marriage.7 It is interesting to note that the recent rise in out-
of-wedlock births occurred at a time when the gross reproductive rate (GRR) was declining.
The small number of out-of-wedlock births is also surprising in light of the fact that for much
of period women tended to marry late (around 26 years of age in the seventeenth century),
with a signi￿cant fraction never marrying￿ see Voightlander and Voth (2009) for a discussion
of the European marriage pattern. The trend in U.S. teenage out-of-wedlock births follows a
very similar pattern￿ recall Figure 2. Why was this practice so limited in the past?
Engaging in premarital sex was, until recently, a risky venture. First, it was illegal and
might have been post-betrothal conceptions (and there are reasons to believe this was the vast share). For the
model developed below it doesn￿ t matter whether the line de￿ning premarital sex is drawn at the betrothal
or the marriage.
7For instance, a typical reason for the large number of cohabitating couples in the Paris of the 19th century
was the legal costs of civil marriage (including a notarized parental consent), which could amount to more
than one month￿ s wage for a poor working couple￿ Fuchs (1992).
7viewed as being morally reprehensible. Second, an out-of-wedlock birth placed a female in
a perilous economic state. Some historical examples of how premarital sex was stigmatized
will now be presented. In 1601, the Lancashire Quarter sessions condemned an unmarried
father and mother of a child to be publicly whipped.8 They then had to sit in the stocks still
naked from the waist upwards. A placard on their heads read ￿ These persons are punished
for fornication.￿ In early America, a New Haven court in 1648 ￿ned a couple for having sex
out of marriage.9 The magistrate ordered that the couple ￿be brought forth to the place of
correction that they may be shamed.￿He said that premarital sex was ￿a sin which lays them
open to shame and punishment in this court. It is that which the Holy Ghost brands with the
name of folly, it is wherein men show their brutishness, therefore as a whip is for the horse
and asse, so a rod is for the fool￿ s back.￿These were not isolated cases. The prosecution of
single men or women either for ￿fornication￿ , or of married couples who had a child before
wedlock, accounted for 53% of all criminal cases in Essex country, Massachusetts, between
1700 and 1785. Likewise, 69% of all criminal cases in New Haven between 1710 and 1750 were
for premarital sex. In the Chesapeake Bay, when an unmarried woman gave birth to a child,
she was levied a large ￿ne or, in case she could not pay, publicly whipped￿ see Fisher(1989).
The otherwise moderate and paci￿c Quakers found that the English Crown decided in 1700 to
suspend their Pennsylvania Law Code of 1683 against fornication because it was unreasonably
harsh, a revealing judgement since the English crown was not particularly progressive in its
views about crime and punishment.
It is also telling that in colonial America, abortion was punished when it was intended
to cover adultery or fornication; however, it was overlooked when it was used as a device to
control fertility within a marriage. In Pennsylvania, the law was taken even one step further.
If a bastard child was found dead, the mother was presumed to be guilty unless she could
prove otherwise, overriding the general English law principle of presumption of innocence.
This change in the principle of the law was particularly harsh, as the punishment for the
crime was hanging.10
The stigma attached to premarital sex, and other forms of illicit sex, is re￿ ected by
the language used to describe such acts. Words such as debauched, lascivious, lewd, loose,
incontinent, vain, and wanton were used to re￿ ect a lack of self control; others such as base,
de￿ling, polluting, unclean, and vile described the desecration of the body associated with
illicit sex; yet others such as adultery, disorderly, indolation, misdirection, rebellion, uncivil,
unlawful, conjured up the notion of civil or religious disobedience and a⁄ected even those
8This case is taken from the classic book by Stone (1977, p. 637).
9The discussion on premarital sex in early America derives from Godbeer (2002).
10See Klepp (1994, p. 74).
8in situations of social prestige and power. So, for example, the son and namesake of the
renowned minister John Cotton was excommunicated in 1664 by the First Church of Boston
￿for lascivious unclean practices with three women.￿
There are also plenty of historical examples of the relationship between the environment
and promiscuity, which will now be discussed. The economic consequences for an unwed
mother and her child could be dire. Churches, courts and parents tried to make the father
and mother of an unwed child marry. The next best option was to ensure that the father paid
child support. Sometimes neither of these two options worked. The outlook for the mother
and child could then be bleak. Note that statute cited at the beginning of this section only
seemed to apply to women that needed support. Now, nineteenth century France, an anomaly
compared with other Western European countries, provides an interesting illustration of how
the environment can a⁄ect social behavior.11 The French Civil Code of 1804 prohibited
questioning by the authorities about the paternity of a child. As a consequence, males could
evade the responsibility for bringing up their illegitimate o⁄spring. Roughly at the same
time, all French hospitals were instructed to receive abandoned children. These laws may
have drastically changed the cost and bene￿t calculations of engaging in premarital sex, and
encouraged illegitimacy and abandonment on a grand scale. In 1816 about 40% of births in
Paris were out of wedlock, and 55% of these children were abandoned. In 1820 a staggering
78% of these kids would have died. (Many of these out-of-wedlock births were undoubtedly
from young women who lived outside of Paris and move to the anonymity of the capital after
getting pregnant.) Why would an unwed mother abandon her child?
The decision to abandon a child was most likely dictated by the economic circumstance.
A woman was paid about half that of a man in a similar job. Her earnings barely covered
her subsistence. In the 1860s, a working woman could earn somewhere between Fr250-600
a year, taking into account seasonal unemployment. It cost approximately Fr300 a year for
rent, clothing, laundry, heat, and light. Even at the maximum salary this didn￿ t leave much
for food￿ less than a franc a day￿ never mind the costs of clothing and wet nursing a baby (the
later is estimated at Fr300 a year). A working woman could certainly not a⁄ord to raise a
child alone. Furthermore, there is evidence, especially for the early part of the century, that
abandonments were correlated with the price of bread.12
Illegitimacy disproportionately a⁄ected the ranks of the working class. In 1883 the Reg-
11The material on France is drawn exclusively from Fuchs (1984).
12The excellent monograph by Boswell (1988) provides a survey of child abandonment in Western Europe
from late antiquity to the Renaissance. Two important conclusions of this study are the following. First,
many abandoned children were born from married couples. Therefore, the statistics on abandonment cannot
be read as statistics on pre-marital sex. Second, abandonment was relatively common even among the elites,
because it precluded succession issues and inheritance disputes (another economic motive).
9istry General for Scotland tabulated that only 0.5% of illegitimate births were to the daughters
of professional men.13 The middle and upper classes had to worry about how illegitimacy
would disrupt the transfer of property through the lineage. English author Samuel Johnson
expressed this concern well: ￿Consider of what importance to society the chastity of women
is. Upon that all the property in the world depends. We hang a thief for stealing a sheep,
but the unchastity of a woman transfers sheep, and farm, and all from the right owner.￿
Illegitimacy was connected to the structure of the environment that the working class lived
in. In nineteenth century Scotland, the Lowlands had a much higher rate of illegitimacy than
the Highlands. This has been tied to economy of the two places, and how it impacted on the
relationship between parents and their children. In the Lowlands labor was mobile. Young
and old laborers independently travelled from farm to farm, district to district, taking work
where available. As a consequence, young males and females freely mixed in the residences of
farms (the chaumer system). A young man could easily evade his responsibility to a pregnant
woman. His parents would su⁄er little stigma, or be forced to lend to ￿nancial support, either.
In the more stable Highlands disappearing was more di¢ cult. Additionally, in the Lowlands
it was easy for unwed mothers to ￿nd jobs milking cows or tending to turnips. Furthermore,
in some places a ploughman had to provide an able-bodied female to work along side (the
bondager system). Since the work unit was often then the family some feel that this meant
that partners had to prove their fertility before marriage.
Other areas of Western Europe with high illegitimacy ratios, like Alpine Austria or north-
ern Portugal, had land property structures that prevented a large number of men and women
from participating in a marriage market (thus eliminating a powerful incentive for avoiding
out-of-wedlock children) and experienced large outmigration.
3. The Economic Environment
Imagine a world comprised by overlapping generations of females and males. Children are
socialized by their parents. This socialization is important when youths decide whether or
not to engage in premarital sex. A high level of socialization by one￿ s parents will induce a
high level of shame if an out-of-wedlock birth occurs. But, why should parents socialize their
o⁄spring? Altruism is the mechanism here. In particular, later in life, old parents realize
utility from the socioeconomic status of the household that their adult daughter lives in.
Daughters who experience out-of-wedlock births are more likely to be in households of low
socioeconomic status than those who don￿ t. Since the likelihood of this situation depends on
13The source for Scotland is Smout (1980).
10the level of socialization given to young daughters, young parents will invest resources in it.
In the analysis socialization is a costly activity, so parents undertake it judiciously.
Agents live for three periods: youth, adulthood, and old age. People are born with
three characteristics: their gender, g 2 ff;mg, either female or male; their productivity
yg 2 Yg ￿ fyg;1;￿￿￿ ;yg;ng; their libido h 2 H = [0;1] which represents the utility they realize
from sex. Exactly half of newborns are females. The distributions over Yg and H are given
by P y and P h: The distributions are equal across males and females (in a sense for P y that is
made clear below). The distribution function P h is strictly concave in h 2 H and is presumed
to be independent across generations. Note that females have the same biological desire for
sex as males. Therefore, any predisposition for premarital sex by males over females will have
to derive from the economics of the model. The distribution over Yg is conditional on the
mother￿ s type; i.e., there is some transfer of ability across generations. In particular, P y(y0jy)
is increasing in y, in the sense of stochastic dominance and P y(y0
f;jjyf;i) = P y(y0
m;jjym;i).
Denote the stationary distribution associated with P y(y0jy) by P
y
. Assume that a suitable
law of large numbers holds in this economy and that, consequently, individual probabilities
equal aggregate shares of realizations of random variables.
4. Youth
Youths live with their parents. Assume each female will always give birth to just one set
of twins, a male and a female. This keeps the birth rate for each type of female ￿xed,
so there is no need to keep track of potential shifts in P y over time due to cross-sectional
di⁄erences in births rates. Thus, there will be no aggregate population growth. Births
happen at the beginning of adult life. The birth of the twins may occur in or out of wedlock.
Children are socialized by their parents at the beginning of their youth. Represent the
level of socialization by s. This denotes some level of investment that parents make in
in￿ uencing a child￿ s views on premarital sex. The word investment is used deliberately.
Noncognitive skills, such as the sense to avoid risky activities such as drinking, doing drugs
or engaging in premarital sex, are important for building a child￿ s human capital. They
complement the formal schooling stressed by economists￿ eg Restuccia and Urritia (2004).
Both the boy and girl in the household are socialized at the same level, say, for example,
because of indivisibilities in education practices. After this socialization occurs, youths decide
whether or not to engage in premarital sex. This is the only decision youths make. If they do
so, they receive a utility h, but the female partner risks a pregnancy with probability 1 ￿ ￿.
Think about ￿ as representing the quality of the contraception technology, including more
drastic measures, speci￿cally abortion and infanticide. For example, it may be reasonable to
11view the 1973 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that legalized abortion as a drop in 1￿￿.
An out-of-wedlock birth will generate a present-value disgrace of D(s). The function D(￿)
is increasing and strictly concave in s. If youths do not engage in premarital sex, they get
utility normalized to zero.
To engage in premarital sex, a youth needs to ￿nd a partner of the opposite gender. If
the proportion of males searching for a female partner is given by ￿m and the proportion of
females searching for a male partner is ￿f, the total number of premarital matches is given by
min(￿m;￿f): Assume that the outcome of this search for premarital sex is random. Hence,
the probability of obtaining premarital sex will be either 1, if the agent belongs to a gender g
where ￿g ￿ ￿￿g, or ￿ = ￿￿g=￿g when ￿g > ￿￿g. It will be established in Section 7 that there
are more males seeking premarital sex than females; i.e., ￿f ￿ ￿m. Hence, a female youth
desiring premarital sex will match with probability one, while a male will ￿nd a partner with
probability ￿ = ￿f=￿m.
Beyond sex, youths obtain utility, U(c), from family consumption, c. Consumption is
a public good within household. The determination of family consumption is described in
Section 5. A female will enter adulthood next period with a known level of productivity, y0,
and perhaps an out-of-wedlock child. Represent the value function for a female adult next
period by Af0 (y0;I0), where I0 is an indicator for having a pair of out-of-wedlock children. In
particular, I0 2 f0;1g will return a value of one when an out-of-wedlock birth occurs. Here
a prime is attached to a variable to denote its value in the next period. Likewise, a prime
is attached to a function to signify that the implied relation changes as time progresses. A
precise de￿nition for Af will be provided in Section 5.
4.1. Premarital Sex
Direct attention now to a female youth￿ s decision about whether or not to engage in premarital
sex. On the one hand, if a female youth is abstinent then she will realize an expected lifetime
utility level of U (c) + ￿Af0 (y0;0). On the other hand, if she engages in premarital sex she
will realize the enjoyment h, but will become pregnant with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Her expected
lifetime utility level will be U (c) + h + ￿￿Af0 (y0;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Af0 (y0;1) ￿ D(s)]. She will
pick the option that generates the highest level of expected lifetime utility. Her decision can
be summarized as follows:
Abstinence if ￿Af0 (y0;0) ￿ h + ￿￿Af0 (y0;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Af0 (y0;1) ￿ D(s)];
Premarital sex if ￿Af0 (y0;0) < h + ￿￿Af0 (y0;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Af0 (y0;1) ￿ D(s)]:
(1)
Pick a row in (1) and ￿x y0 and s. Observe that the right-hand side is increasing in h



















This expression equates the utility of sex, given by hf￿, with its expected cost, the di⁄erence
in future expected utilities induced by an out-of-wedlock birth plus the disgrace associated
with this event, multiplied by the probability of pregnancy. Hence, a threshold rule of the
form hf￿ = Hf (y0;s) obtains such that for h > Hf (y0;s) the female agent will seek sex,
and will not otherwise. The odds of a type-y0 female youth, with a socialization level of s,
engaging in premarital sex are given by
￿(s;y







while the probability of becoming pregnant is
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(s;y
0):
The decision making for a male youth is analogous. The value function for a young male
adult, Am0 (y0), does not depend on whether or not he had any out-of-wedlock children. This
assumption embodies the idea that historically fathers could walk away from their children
outside marriage. Recall that a male youth will only ￿nd a female partner with probability
￿. Therefore, a male will choose
Abstinence if
￿Am0 (y0) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Am0 (y0)
+￿fh + ￿￿Am0 (y0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Am0 (y0) ￿ D(s)]g;
Premarital sex if
￿Am0 (y0) < (1 ￿ ￿)￿Am0 (y0)
+￿fh + ￿￿Am0 (y0) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Am0 (y0) ￿ D(s)]g:
The threshold libido level for males, hm￿, will be de￿ned by
￿A
m0 (y
0) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿A
m0 (y
0) + ￿fh + ￿￿A
m0 (y






m (s) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)D(s): (4)
13Note that for males the cost of premarital sex is equal to the disgrace cost times the probability
of a pregnancy, because they can simply walk away from out-of-wedlock children. Therefore,
the lifetime utility for an adult male is orthogonal to the decision of having premarital sex
or not. This decision rule de￿nes a simple invertible mapping between s and hm￿. Given
P h, the probability of a young male searching for sex is just 1 ￿ P h (hm￿), the probability of
engaging in sex is ￿[1 ￿ P h (hm￿)]; and the probability of having an out-of-wedlock birth is




At the start of adulthood, females and males match for the rest of their lives. Now, a female
will enter a marriage with productivity level, yf, and possibly some out-of-wedlock children,
I. All adult females and males are matched, according to some rule that may be a function
of (yf;ym;I). Suppose that the conditional odds of a type-(yf;I) female drawing a type-ym
male on the marriage market are described by the distribution function P f (ymjyf;I). The
precise form of this conditional distribution will depend upon the assumed matching process;
this is discussed in Section 5.1. A married couple derives utility from consumption, children,
and the leisure of each person. These are all public goods enjoyed jointly by husband and
wife.
An adult has one unit of time, which is split between market and nonmarket activity.
Working in the market requires ! units of time. Denote the productivity on the market
for an e¢ ciency unit of labor by ￿. A male earns on the market ￿!ym. An out-of-wedlock
birth is assumed to reduce a female￿ s productivity. For instance, it may prevent her from
attaining an education or on-the-job training. Suppose that the presence of an out-of-wedlock
birth taxes a female￿ s productivity at the rate T(yf;I), with T(yf;0) = 0, 0 ￿ T(yf;1) ￿ 1,
T1(yf;1) ￿ 0, and [1 ￿ T(e yf;1)]e yf ￿ [1 ￿ T(yf;1)]yf if e yf ￿ yf. Therefore, a household with
a female of type (yf;I) and a male of type ym can produce consumption when young and old
in the amounts
c = C




o (yf;ym;I) = ￿
0!f[1 ￿ T(yf;I)]yf + ymg:
The utility from consumption when young and old will be U(c) and U(c0). The children living
with a young couple will also realize the utility level U(c) from household consumption.
An old couple also derives joy from their daughter￿ s family. Let (y0
f;y0
m;I0) represent the
14characteristics of their adult daughter￿ s household. This describes the socioeconomic status
of the daughter￿ s family. It generates G(y0
f;y0
m;I0) in utility for her old parents. The function
G is increasing in y0
f and y0
m, and decreasing in I0. The old couple￿ s utility rises in y0
f and
y0
m because higher types make more in income and hence the daughter￿ s family will enjoy a
higher living standard. Social status may be increasing in type too. Parental utility declines
in I0 because an out-of-wedlock birth for the daughter will reduce consumption per person
in her family, ceteris paribus. It may also incur stigma. As an example, one could simply










So, an out-of-wedlock birth directly reduces the utility that old parents will realize from
their adult daughter through the in￿ uence of I0 in the function G. The presence of an out-
of-wedlock birth may also a⁄ect the quality of the husband, y0
m, that the daughter will draw





. These two reasons
explain why young parent￿ s socialize their young daughters in the model. In societies where
parent￿ s lose contact with their children, the marginal in￿ uence of G in determining total
utility will be small. Therefore, one might think in such societies that parents will socialize
their children less.
De￿ne V ((1 + ￿I)s) as the disutility that each parent gets from socializing a pair of twins
to level s. Think about this as representing the cost in terms of e⁄ort of inculcating the child
with a certain set of values. This function is increasing and convex in s. Note that disutility
from socializing the twins is higher for an out-of-wedlock birth (when ￿ > 0); perhaps the
father is less engaged in their upbringing so that the mother must expend more e⁄ort to attain
a given level of socialization. A mother￿ s leisure is given by 1 ￿ ! ￿ (1 + ￿I)s. Therefore,
￿V ((1 + ￿I)s) can be thought of as representing couple￿ s utility function for the wife￿ s leisure.
The male￿ s leisure is constant at 1￿!, and hence the utility the couple derives from this can
be disregarded.








Therefore, the expected level of utility for a young adult couple in a marriage of type
15(yf;ym;I;y0








a (yf;ym;I)) + ￿U(C










































































f) gives the expected value for a type-(yf;I) young adult female
marrying a type-ym young adult male, who together have type y0
f daughters, and vice versa.
Recall that a male youth simply walks away from the responsibility of any out-of-wedlock
births. Therefore, the family￿ s income will not be a function of his own out-of-wedlock
children. Consequently, it is irrelevant whether or not parent￿ s care about the living standards
of their sons. This will merely be some constant that is independent of s. Then, the value















5.1. Positive Assortative Matching
Recall that the expected lifetime utility in marriage accruing from consumption and other
factors is a public good, enjoyed in equal fashion by husband and wife. Suppose that there
is perfect assortative mating based on what each party will contribute to this expected life-


















is de￿ned by P(1). There will be 2n2 possible pairings in L. Let F
represent the joint distribution for females over (yj;I). Then, the number of females of type
(yf;j;I) will be given by #(yf;j;I) = F(yf;j;I) ￿ F(yf;j￿1;I). Similarly, #(ym;k) denotes the
number of type-yk males.
To characterize the implied matching process simply make a list of lifetime utilities from
pairings, starting from the top and going down to the bottom. The best females will be
16matched with best males. Now, suppose that there are more of these males than females.
Then, some of the males will have to match with the next best females on the list. The
matching process continues down this list in this fashion. At each stage the remaining best
males are matched with the remaining best females. If there is an excess supply of one of the
sexes, the over￿ ow of this sex must ￿nd a match on the next line(s) of the list.
Now, suppose that the l-th position on the list is represented by a match of type (yf;j;ym;k;I).
Some type-ym;k males may have already been allocated to females that are higher on the
list; i.e., to women that have a better combination of yf and I. Let Rl
m(ym;k) be the
amount of remaining type-ym;k males that can be allocated at the l-th position on the
list. Similarly, let Rl
f(yf;j;I) be the number of available type-(yf;j;I) females. The num-
ber of matches is given by minfRl
m(ym;k);Rl
f(yf;j;I)g. Thus, the odds of a match are
Pr(ym;kjyf;j;I) = minfRl
m(ym;k);Rl
f(yf;j;I)g=#(yf;j;I). The matching process is then sum-
marized by
Ranking Lifetime Utility Odds












2n2 L(yf;1;ym;1;1) Pr(ym;1jyf;1;I = 1) = 1;
(8)
where Rl+1




m(ym;k) = #(ym;k), and
R
l+1





It is easy to see P f (ymjyf;I) = Pr(y ￿ ymjyf;I) =
Pm
j=1 Pr(y = yjjyf;I). Now, the distribu-
tion function P f (ymjyf;0) will stochastically dominate the one represented by P f (ymjyf;1),
because having an out-of-wedlock birth will not increase the chances of a female drawing a
male with an income greater than some speci￿ed level.
Any degree of assortative matching in the economy can be obtained by assuming that
some fraction ￿ of each type mates in the above fashion while the remaining fraction, 1 ￿ ￿,
matches randomly. With random matching Pr(ymjyf;I) = #(ym), so that P f (ymjyf;I) =
Pm
j=1 #(ym;j).
The matching process follows the Gale and Shapley (1962) algorithm￿ see Del Boca and
Flinn (2006) for a recent marriage application. The cue for randomness in matching comes
from FernÆndez and Rogerson (2001). Since all consumption for the couple is a public good,




Figure 4: The determination of s
no complementarities between the husband and wife￿ s types in the production of household
income. If these assumptions were relaxed, then a matching process along the lines of Becker
(1981) could be used￿ see Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009) or Choo and Siow (2009) for
recent work using this approach.
5.2. Solution for Socialization
The solution to problem P(1) can now be characterized. Maximizing with respect to s yields
the ￿rst-order condition



































= (1 + ￿I)V1((1 + ￿I)s): (9)
Now, from the above e¢ ciency condition it is apparent that the level of socialization for a
daughter, s, will be a function of her type, y0
f, and whether there are any out-of-wedlock
births in the family, I, so that s = S(y0
f;I).
The right-hand side of equation (9) is increasing in s, because V is convex. The slope of











f￿)(1 ￿ ￿)D1 (s): (10)






decreasing in s, a fact evident from (2). Therefore, the left-hand side of (9) declines with s.
To summarize, the situation is portrayed by Figure 4.
6. Steady-State Equilibrium
Suppose that the economy is in a steady state. Recall that F represents the joint distribution
for females over (yf;I). In a steady state this distribution will be given by
F(y
0






































The ￿rst term in (11) gives the number of young girls with a productivity level less than y0
f,
who came from a family without out-of-wedlock births, that will in turn experience an out-
of-wedlock birth. The second term gives the number of young girls with a productivity level
less than y0
f, and who were born in a family with out-of-wedlock births, that will experience
an out-of-wedlock birth.
De￿nition. A steady-state equilibrium consists of a threshold libido rule for female




, a rule for how young parents socialize their daughters, s = S(y0
f;I),




, and the stationary distrib-
ution for unmarried females, F(y0
f;I0), such that:
1. The threshold rule for a female youth maximizes her utility, as speci￿ed by (2).
2. The parents￿socialization rule maximizes their utility in line with P(1).
3. The matching probability is determined in line with the process described by (8).
4. The stationary distribution for unmarried females is given by (11).
7. Results
Since a male youth can simply walk away from an out-of-wedlock birth, all he will su⁄er is
the momentary disgrace associated with his dalliance. By contrast, the impact of an out-
of-wedlock birth is more severe for a female. First, it will lower the income she will make.
19Second, their presence will a⁄ect her future matching possibilities. Third, it could prove
more costly to socialize her kids if her future husband feels distant from them. Therefore,
one would expect that males will engage more in premarital sex than are females. If so,
females will be in short supply on the market for premarital sex so that all males will not be
able to ￿nd a willing partner.
Lemma 1. (Lustful males) Male youths have a lower libido threshold than do female youths
so that hm￿ < hf￿.









> 0, where female and male youths￿productivity levels are now denoted by y0
f
and y0





















> 0; (ii) Pr(y0 ￿ y0
mjy0









is increasing in y0
m.
Corollary 2. More male youths desire to engage in premarital sex than females, ￿f < ￿m
so that ￿ = ￿f=￿m.
It is interesting to ask how an increase in the general standard of living that will face
a teenage girl when she becomes a young adult, as indexed by ￿0, will a⁄ect the level of
socialization that she will receive from her parents, s. This depends on how it impacts on
the utility di⁄erentials between having and not having an out-of-wedlock birth in the family,
for both the girl and her parents, as the lemma below makes clear. The shape of the utility
function for consumption, U, plays an important role in determining how a young girl￿ s future
income will in￿ uence her decision about whether or not to engage in premarital sex. Likewise,
the form of the altruism function, G, which governs how parents care about their o⁄spring,
will e⁄ect how the child￿ s future income will in￿ uence her parents￿socialization decision.
Specialize G to have the form G(y0
f;y0




) in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. (The impact of growth on socialization) Suppose that U and G are isoelastic
functions of consumption. Then, the level of socialization, s, is related to productivity, ￿0, in
the following manner:
(i) If U and G are logarithmic (as will be the case in the simulations) an increase in ￿0 has
no e⁄ect on s;
(ii) If U is logarithmic, G is more (less) concave than logarithmic, and matching is random,
an increase in ￿0, holding ￿xed the future levels of e¢ ciencies, ￿00;￿000;￿￿￿, reduces (increases)
s;
(iii) If G is logarithmic, U is more (less) concave than logarithmic, and matching is random, an
20increase in ￿0, holding ￿xed the future levels of e¢ ciencies, ￿00;￿000;￿￿￿, increases (decreases)
s.





















) are increasing or decreasing in ￿0 depending on whether the functions U
and G are less or more concave than logarithmic. When they are logarithmic these two di⁄er-
ences are not a function of ￿0. Given this, the ￿rst result follows almost immediately from the
￿rst-order condition (9), as can be deduced from a guess-and-verify procedure. Suppose that
s;s0;s00;￿￿￿ are una⁄ected by ￿0. Then, there is no impact on the matching probabilities,
P f(y0
mjy0
f;I0)￿ s, because a shift in ￿0 does not change the ranking or mass of each type of
female. The di⁄erence in expected lifetime utilities, Af0(y0
f;0) ￿ Af0(y0
f;1), is not a⁄ected by





will remain constant from (2) and (10). Condition (9) will
still hold. Next, turn attention to part (ii). An increase in ￿0 will cause the term in brackets









change. The latter point obtains because U is logarithmic, ￿00;￿000;￿￿￿ are being held ￿xed,
and matching is random. The result follows￿ again, see (2) and (10). Last, direct attention to
(iii). Now, the term in brackets on the left-hand side of (9) will not change when ￿0 increases.





will rise when U is more concave than logarithmic. This
transpires because Af0(y0
f;0)￿Af0(y0
f;1) falls when ￿0 rises under random matching, holding
￿xed ￿00;￿000;￿￿￿.
The above results make intuitive sense. When G is more concave than logarithmic an
increase in ￿0 narrows the di⁄erence in parents￿ s utilities between the situations where their
daughter has and does not have an out-of-wedlock birth, ceteris paribus.14 Therefore, they
spend less time socializing her. Likewise, if U is more concave than logarithmic then the
di⁄erence in lifetime utilities that a young girl receives across these two situations contracts,
other things equal. Therefore, her threshold libido level rises. Parents counteracts this by
socializing her more. In general it appears that a rise in ￿0 can have any e⁄ect on s.
Corollary 4. (The impact of a girl￿ s ability on her socialization) When matching is random
and the draw for a female￿ s productivity is independent across generations, the level of so-
14On another note, rewrite the function G as G(Ca0(y0
f;y0
m;I)) = ￿e G(Ca0(y0
f;y0
m;I)), where e G is an in-
creasing function. Now, reduce the parents￿connection with their daughter by lowering the value of ￿ (while
holding ￿xed their daughter￿ s connection with her progeny). Then, it is immediate from (9) that s will fall.
This suggests that in societies when parents lose connection with their children there may be less incentive
to socialize. A complete proof would have to take into account that a shift in ￿ across all generations would
a⁄ect ￿1 through Af0.
21cialization for a young female, s, is increasing or decreasing in her own level of productivity,
y0
f, depending on whether U is less or more concave than logarithmic.
Proof. The proof is similar to Case (iii) in the Lemma.
When matching is assortative, it may transpire that a rise in productivity improves a female￿ s









narrows even when U is less concave than logarithmic.
A young mother with an out-of-wedlock birth may have to spend more e⁄ort to socialize
her children, because her husband may be less attached to them. If so, out-of-wedlock children
will be socialized less about the perils of premarital sex than those born in wedlock. These
kids in turn will be more likely to experience an out-of-wedlock birth.
Lemma 5. (Shameful mother, shameful daughter) The level of socialization, s, will be lower
in families with out-of-wedlock children, I = 1 (when ￿ > 0).
Proof. The right-hand side of (9) shifts up with I, leading to a fall in s.
Autocorrelation in either income or libido is likely to generate this phenomena too. Estab-
lishing theoretically when this will transpire for these situations would be a more di¢ cult
task.
Consider a temporary improvement in the e¢ cacy of contraception. That is, imagine
that ￿ increases while holding ￿xed ￿0;￿00;￿￿￿. One might think that as contraception
becomes more e⁄ective, the marginal bene￿t from inculcating the current generation of
children about the perils of premarital sex will fall since parents￿daughters are less likely
to become pregnant. This isn￿ t necessarily the case; because, an increase in the e¢ cacy
of contraception will raise the likelihood that a daughter will be promiscuous, boosting
the bene￿t from socialization. From the parents￿ ￿rst-order condition (9), it is appar-











= (1 ￿ ￿)
2 P h
1 (hf￿)D1 (s), by (10). Therefore, a rise in ￿ will reduce the
marginal bene￿t of socialization, s, holding ￿xed hf￿. But, ceteris paribus, an increase in ￿
reduces the threshold level of libido, hf￿￿ see (2). This operates to increase P h
1 (hf￿), when
P h is strictly concave. Therefore, an assumption on the elasticity of the density for P h is
required to ensure that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates.
Assumption 6. (Elasticity restriction on the libido distribution, P h) Suppose that (1 ￿
￿)2P h
1 ((1 ￿ ￿)x) is decreasing in ￿ for all x > 0; i.e., the elasticity of P h
1 ((1 ￿ ￿)x) with
respect to 1 ￿ ￿ is smaller than 2 (in absolute value).
Lemma 7. (Concavity restriction on P h) Suppose that P h((1 ￿ ￿)x) is strictly convex in
ln(1 ￿ ￿). Then, the above assumption holds.







The second derivative is then
x(1 ￿ ￿)P
h





Strict convexity will imply that
P
h
1 ((1 ￿ ￿)x) + (1 ￿ ￿)xP
h
11((1 ￿ ￿)x) > 0:
This is the same thing as saying (1￿￿)P h
1 ((1￿￿)x) is decreasing in ￿. If (1￿￿)P h
1 ((1￿￿)x)
is decreasing in ￿ then so is (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)P h
1 ((1 ￿ ￿)x) = (1 ￿ ￿)2P h
1 ((1 ￿ ￿)x).
The assumption in the lemma limits the amount of permissable concavity in P h, so to speak.
In particular, any P y function that is convex will satisfy it. Only some that are concave will,
though.
Lemma 8. (The de-stigmatization of sex) Assume Assumption (6) holds and that matching
is random. An increase in the current level of the e¢ ciency of contraception, ￿, holding ￿xed
the future levels of e¢ ciencies, ￿0;￿00;￿￿￿, will reduce the current level of socialization, s.






creasing in ￿, when s is held ￿xed. This follows from (10) and the above assumption. Using
Figure 4 it is easy to see that this will lead to a drop in s.
It is of interest to calculate the impact that an improvement in contraception has on the
number of out-of-wedlock births. A naive view is that an improvement in contraception will
lead to a decline in the number of out-of-wedlock births. Figures 2 and 3 quickly dispel the
empirical veracity of this notion. They suggest young females became more promiscuous as
a result of technological innovation in contraception. Thus, there is a tug of war between
two opposing e⁄ects. Now, suppose that initially, when contraception is rudimentary, only
some small number of girls engage in premarital sex. One would expect that the number
of out-of-wedlock births will rise from this small number with an incremental improvement
in contraception as more girls are encouraged to engage in sex with little change in the
failure rate. As technological progress continues to improve at some point the number of
out-of-wedlock births must decline because contraception will eventually become perfect.
This conjecture holds under some simplifying assumptions. Assume that female pro-
ductivity is independently distributed across generations. Also, suppose that the level of
23socialization that a child receives does not depend on I. This occurs when the cost of social-
ization does not depend upon the presence of an out-of-wedlock birth (￿ = 0). Then, it is
easy to deduce that the steady-state number of out-of-wedlock births, b, is given by















￿; for h 2 [0;1] and 0 < ￿ < 1: (13)
Note that the above distribution satis￿es Assumption (6).
Lemma 10. (A rise and fall in out-of-wedlock births) Assume that Assumption (9) holds and
that matching is random. Hold ￿xed the e¢ cacy of contraception in the future, or ￿0;￿00;￿￿￿.
Now, suppose that a small number of young women [in the sense that 1 ￿ minh￿
f P h(h￿
f) <
￿=(1 + ￿)] are engaged in premarital sex when ￿ = 0. Then, db=d￿ > 0 when ￿ = 0, and
db=d￿ < 0 when ￿ = 1, assuming that ds=d￿ < 0.

























When doing the above calculation note that Af0 (y0;0) ￿ Af0 (y0;1) does not change, because
￿00;￿000;￿￿￿ are being held ￿xed, and matching is random. The functional form assumption


































Now, suppose ￿ ’ 0. Note that if 1￿minP h(h￿
f) < ￿=(1+￿) then (1+￿)
R
P h(h￿
f)dP y > 1.
Therefore, db=d￿ > 0 since ds=d￿ < 0. Likewise, when ￿ ’ 1 it follows that the expression
will be negative, since P h(h￿
f) ’ 0 because h￿
f ’ 0.
248. Simulation
It would be di¢ cult to uncover much more about the model by using pencil and paper
techniques alone. So, the model will now be simulated to see if it can explain the rise in
premarital sex and the increase in out-of-wedlock births over the last century. Surely, this is
no less general than imposing simpli￿cations on the model￿ s structure so that the analysis can
proceed along theoretical lines. It also imposes discipline on the analysis, because showing
that something can be obtained qualitatively is not the same thing as demonstrating that
it can happen quantitatively. Simulating the model requires choosing functional forms and
picking parameter values. The model will be calibrated to match the data available for the
modern era, say 2000.
To begin with, parameterize the utility functions for consumption, U(c), the joy old





the disgrace an unmarried girl will su⁄er from an out-of-wedlock birth, D(s); and the disutility



















;V (s(1 + ￿I)) = ￿ln(1 ￿ ! ￿ s(1 + ￿I)):
Note that G is assumed to be separable between the utility that parents get from their
daughter￿ s consumption and the stigma they feel if their daughter has an out-of-wedlock
birth. The latter is assumed to be a function of the productivity loss associated with an
out-of-wedlock birth.
The analysis will focus on several stylized facts categorized with respect to a female￿ s
educational background. There will be three groups for educational attainment: viz, less
than high school, <HS; high school and some college, HS; college and post-college, C. The
productivity distributions for females and males need to be speci￿ed for each category of
education. An educational group is divided into six productivity levels corresponding to the
average wage rate for those individuals lying within the following ranges for percentiles: 0 to
10, 10 to 25, 25 to 50, 50 to 75, 75 to 90, and 90 to 100. Thus, there are 18 productivity levels
in all for each sex. The ranking of income levels does not map monotonically into education
groups. For example, women in the upper end of the high school pay scale earn more than
those at the lower end of the college one. This procedure is a variation on the one employed
in Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2008). The parameterization adopted for the stationary
distribution, P
y
, is summarized in Table I, which shows the mean level of productivity for
each education group. The ￿gures have been normalized by the mean wage rate for the entire
25sample.
Table I: Prod. Dist.
yf ym P
y
<HS 0.49 0.72 0.129
HS 0.72 0.98 0.596
C 1.14 1.43 0.275
(Means, tabulated from 2000 CPS)




, the following simple repre-
sentation:
y0
f;i = yf;i; with probability ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr(yf;i),
y0
f;i = yf;j (for i 6= j); with probability (1 ￿ ￿)Pr(yf;j);
where Pr(yf;j) represents the odds of drawing yf;j from the stationary distribution. With this
structure, ￿ determines the autocorrelation across types over time within a family. Following
Knowles (1999) set the intergenerational persistence across generations at 0:70, so that ￿ =
0:7.













￿(yf;1 ￿yf;0)g=yf;i; for i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;N;
where N = 16 and yf;0 ￿ 0. With this formulation, the tax function is determined by the
three parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿. The tax rate starts at ￿ and then rises in a progressive fashion
(when ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 1) with income, yf;i.
The annual failure rate for contraception in 2000 was 28%, so that the odds of safe sex are
72%￿ see Greenwood and Guner (forth.). An average teenager does not engage in premarital
sex all the time. On average, females have about 3 partners by age 19.15 Furthermore,
teenage relationships tend to be short, about 13 months.16 Taking ages 14 to 19, inclusive,
as the window for teenagers to have premarital sex, on average teenage females are exposed
about half of this time to risk. So, for the modern era ￿ = 1 ￿ 0:28=2 = 0:86; i.e., the odds
of a sexually active teenager not becoming pregnant are taken to be 86%. Last, the libido
distribution will be taken to be characterized by (13).
There are 13 parameter values to determine, f￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;!;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿g. Around
2000, the median age at ￿rst premarital sex was about 17.6, while the median age at ￿rst
15The source is Abma et al. (2004, Table 13, p. 26)
16Sources: Ryan, Manlove, and Franzetta (2003) and Udry and Bearman (1998).
26marriage was about 25 for females.17 Taking 0.96 as a standard value for yearly discount
factor, let ￿ = 0:967, re￿ ecting the fact that there is about a 7 year gap between the time of
￿rst premarital sex and the time of ￿rst marriage. A male is assumed spend 1/3 of his time
endowment working so set ! = 1=3. Given the form of preferences the level of productivity
aggregate productivity, ￿, will not matter￿ recall Lemma 3. So let ￿! = 1. The remaining
parameters are picked to match three sets of targets discussed below. The parameter values
for the model are listed in Table II.
1. The ￿rst target is the cross-sectional relationship between a girl￿ s education and the
likelihood that she will have premarital sex. The odds of premarital sex decrease with
education, as can be seen from Figure 5. Both in the data and in the model, about 66%
of girls have premarital sex. The calibrated model matches this cross-sectional feature
of the data reasonably well, as can also be seen from Figure 5.
2. The next target is the amount of time that a mother spends with her child, as a function
of the mother￿ s educational background. Time increases with education, as Figure 6
illustrates. The model is good at mimicking this feature of the data too, as can be seen
from the ￿gure.
3. The last target is the correlation between a husband￿ s and wife￿ s education in the U.S.,
for women with and without out-of-wedlock births. The match between the data and
model is shown in Table III. The model has little trouble reproducing the facts. The
presence of an out￿ of-wedlock birth reduces the degree of assortative mating.
17The median age at ￿rst premarital sex is taken from Finer (2007), and is for the period 1994-

























Figure 5: Cross-sectional relationship between the odds of a girl engaging in premarital sex











Figure 6: Cross-sectional relationship between the time spent with a daughter and the


































Figure 7: Implicit tax on an out-of-wedlock birth by education level, model
Table II: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comment
Tastes
￿ = (0:96)7 Standard
￿ = 2:41, ￿ = 0:16, ￿ = 5:74, ￿ = 0:45 Calibrated
￿ = 0:21, ￿ = 0:08 Calibrated
Productivity
yi￿ s￿ see Table I for average values. U.S. data
￿ = 1=! Normalization
￿ = 0:70 Knowles (1999)
! = 1=3 Standard
Matching
￿ = 0:82 Calibrated
Tax Schedule
￿ = 5000, ￿ = 5:1, ￿ = 0:03 Calibrated
Libido
￿ = 0:76 Calibrated
Contraception











































Figure 8: Left panel, Cross-sectional relationship between the daughter￿ s shame from an out-
of-wedlock birth and her mother￿ s educational background, data; Right panel, Cross-sectional
relationship between the daughter￿ s expected stigma from engaging in premarital sex and her
mother￿ s educational background, model
Table III: Correlations￿ Matching by Educ.
Data Model
Female￿ s history
Without out-of-wedlock birth 0.49 0.47
With out-of-wedlock birth 0.29 0.32
The implicit tax schedule on an out-of-wedlock birth is shown in Figure 7. It weighs high
on a young women at the upper end of the (potential) education scale. It is interesting to
note that the likelihood a teenage girl will feel ￿very upset￿if she gets pregnant increases
with her mother￿ s education background, as the left panel of Figure 8 makes clear. The right
panel plots for the model a measure of the expected stigma associated with premarital sex.18

















fjyf)dF(yf;1)]. Normalize this by the expected level of libido, which is 1=(￿ + 2).

























































Figure 9: Sexual revolution
8.1. The Computational Experiment
Imagine starting the world o⁄ in a situation where premarital sex is risky. Speci￿cally,
assume in the initial situation that the annual failure rate for contraception is 72%; this is
Greenwood and Guner￿ s (forth) estimate for 1900. This implies that the odds of safe sex are
1-0.72/2=64%. Let the failure rate decline smoothly over time from 36 to 14%￿ the number
picked earlier for 2000. The inputted time pro￿le for the odds of safe sex is displayed in the
left panel of Figure 9. So, what will happen in the economy under study?
The increase in the e¢ cacy of contraception induces a sexual revolution in the model,
which is displayed in the right panel of Figure 9. The number of women practicing premarital
sex rises from 16% to 64%. It is reasonable to postulate that the number of women engaging
in premarital sex translates directly into a measure of that generation that has a favorable
attitude toward it. At any point of time, in the real world society is made up of many
generations of women, each of which had a di⁄erent sexual experience. Averaging across
all generations gives a measure of society￿ s attitude toward premarital sex. Do this for the
three generations in the model. As can be seen, attitudes lag current sexual practice.19
Additionally, as contraception becomes more e⁄ective, parents socialize their daughters less￿
Figure 10. Interestingly, the number of out-of-wedlock births rise.
19See footnote 23 for an illustration of how stigma may be transmitted over time. This leads to persistence
in parents￿socialization decisions.
























































Figure 10: The decline in socialization and the rise in out-of-wedlock births
8.2. The Importance of Socialization: Some Counterfactual Experiments
One can ask how important in the model is socialization for curtailing premarital sex. To
gauge the signi￿cance of this, three counterfactual experiments are run. First, one could ask
what would happen if parents did not socialize their children at all (s = 0). The results of this
experiment are shown in the upper right quadrant of Figure 11. As can be seen, promiscuity
would run rampant in the model. Even in the old steady state 73% of girls would engage in
premarital sex. A large fraction of these girls would become pregnant, given the poor state of
contraception. This compares with just 16% in the baseline model.20 Second, one could ask
what would happen if parents maintained their old steady-state levels of socialization even
in face of technological improvement in contraception. As can be seen from the lower left
quadrant, the vast majority of girls would remain abstinent. These two experiments suggest
that socialization plays an important role in the model. Third, the lower right quadrant plots
the transitional dynamics for model in the situation where parents always follow the new
steady-state pattern of socialization. Here 35% of girls would engage in premarital sex in the
initial period (again compared with 16% in the baseline model). Note that the transitional
dynamics to the new steady state are faster than in the baseline model.
To cast further light on the importance of socialization, imagine that a teenage girl grows
up in a nation (the old country) with a primitive state of contraception (￿ = 0:64). Her
parents socialize her according to the environment there. Now, suppose that around 15 years
20In a similar vein, one could ask how important is assortative matching in the model. This can be gauged
by setting ￿ = 0, so that all matches are random. In the old steady state the number of girls experiencing
premarital sex would rise from 16 to 19%, while in the new steady state they would increase from 64 to 70%.
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Figure 11: The impact of socialization on premarital sex, some counterfactual experiments
of age the girl and her family immigrate to another nation (the new country) with a more
advanced state of contraception (￿ = 0:86). In the new country the teenager will decide
whether or not to engage in premarital sex. She will do this so as to maximize her lifetime
utility, taking into account the odds of becoming pregnant, how a pregnancy will e⁄ect
her new-country socioeconomic status, and how becoming pregnant will relate to her old-
country set of values. Figure 12 illustrates the upshot of this thought experiment. The young
teenager￿ s odds of engaging in premarital decrease as a function of her mother￿ s education. In
general a girl whose mother is educated has more to lose from engaging in this risky activity
than one whose isn￿ t. Note that an immigrant is much less likely to engage in premarital
sex than a native is, at all education levels. Native girls received less socialization about the
perils of premarital sex than the immigrant did. Their parents are more liberal about this,
because the risk of becoming pregnant is much less in the new country versus the old country.
Overall, 31% of immigrant girls will engage in premarital sex as opposed to 64% of native
ones. Culture a⁄ects decisions but the economic environment also a⁄ects culture.
Even though socialization plays an important role in the current model it may be possible
to match the rise in premarital sex without including it, say by appealing to technological
progress in contraception alone. The observed shift in culture would then re￿ ect a passive























Figure 12: The cross-sectional odds of premarital sex in the immigration thought experiment
oped where parents play an important role in inculcating social norms into their children.
The cost/bene￿t calculus governing this process is a⁄ected by the state of society￿ s technol-
ogy. Cross-sectional di⁄erences in this cost/bene￿t calculus help identify the parameters of
the model. Observations on the likelihood that a girl will engage premarital sex by her own
educational background, the time spent socializing children by a mother￿ s educational attain-
ment, and the degree of assortative mating by the amount of schooling with and without an
out-of-wedlock birth are used. In the next section, the analysis will be extended to modeling
socialization by institutions such as the church or state. Deciphering precisely how important
a role socialization plays in a⁄ecting a teenager￿ s sexual behavior, in contrast to other fac-
tors, would require a more exacting quantitative analysis where the parameters of the model
could be identi￿ed with precision. Perhaps there are other cross-sectional observations that
might help toward this end. In any event, the qualitative evidence provided by historians
specializing in demographic issues strongly suggests that socialization played an important
role tampering down premarital sex.
9. The Church and State: An Extension
Illegitimacy imposes a ￿nancial burden on state and church. Di⁄erent European states orga-
nized and funded orphanages and conservatories that took care of abandoned children, mostly
illegitimate ones￿ see McCants (1997), Sa￿ ey (1997), Sherwood (1989) and Terpstra (2005)
34for historical background. Churches, as long as they underwrote charity work, faced a similar
burden.
To avoid these ￿nancial costs, both churches and states have used over history extensive
instruments to reduce premarital sex and illegitimacy. Section 2 discussed how states em-
ployed criminal procedures to punish premarital sex. But other tools were available. One
particularly powerful one was the legal concept of illegitimacy. Both in Civil law and Common
law countries, a child was illegitimate if it was born to parents who were not legally married
to one another at the time of birth, even if they later married. Illegitimate children were
subject to a large number of discriminatory measures, from merely symbolic (as stating in
the child￿ s birth certi￿cate his or her condition as illegitimate) to reduced inheritance rights￿
see Beckert (2007) and Witte (2009).21 The most harsh of those was the English Common
law idea of ￿lius nullius (child of nobody): having no right to inherit from either father or
mother, no right to the surname of either parent, and no claim on them for support or educa-
tion. Interestingly enough, these legal mandates were explicitly justi￿ed as a way to prevent
premarital sex. As the Earl of Selborne states in Clarke v. Car￿n Co. (1891), A.C. 412,
427, this policy was designed for ￿the encouragement of marriage and the discouragement
of illicit intercourse.￿Policies directed at generating shame rather than explicit punishment
were also widespread. For instance, in colonial Virginia, women engaged in premarital sex
were required to o⁄er a public apology in front of the congregated parish dressed in a white
sheet and carrying a white wand￿ Brown (1996). Finally, there were more informal instru-
ments in the form of some socially sanctioned activities such as supervised courtship rituals
or the spread of the charivari as a ritual prosecution￿ Muir (2005). A particularly interesting
strategy was the New England￿ s practice of ￿bundling.￿A courting couple were allowed to
lie together but separated by a bundling board with, often, the woman￿ s legs bound together
by a bundling stocking￿ Fisher (1989). This institution allowed intimacy for the young couple
without sexual contact.
There is little doubt that illegitimacy taxed the resources of church and state. A ￿ne,
call leyrwite, was levied on the bondwomen of medivial English manors. The name describes
its purpose and is based on two AngloSaxon elements: ￿ leger￿to lie down and ￿ wite￿a ￿ne.
This tax on fornication (6d versus a daily wage of 3/4d) levied by the Lord and Lady of
the manor was aimed at discouraging bastardy, which placed great ￿nancial strain on the
manorial community￿ see Bennett (2003). (The Church punished fornicators more ruthlessly.)
21A simple way to keep the stigma of illegitimacy public existed in Spain. By tradition, children use in
daily life both the family name of the father and the mother. Women do not take the family name of their
husband when they marry. Consequently, any person that used exclusively his mother￿ s family name was
immediately identi￿ed as illegitimate.
35A related ￿ne was childwite, which was levied on out-of-wedlock births. Stone (1977) relates
how parish authorities in England frequently worked to ensure that bastards were birthed
outside of their local jurisdictions, so that they would not have to absorb a ￿nancial liability.
Hayden (1942-43) discusses a similar situation in eighteenth century Ireland. Churchwardens
often employed a ￿ parish nurse.￿This person was commonly known as a ￿ lifter.￿Her task was
to round up secretly abandoned foundlings and deposit them in a nearby parish. Sometimes
she sedated the baby with a narcotic, diacodium, to mu› e any crying. One woman, Elizabeth
Hayland in the Parish of St. John￿ s, lifted 27 babies in a year. Seven died in her care. A
baby that she dropped o⁄ in the Parish of St. Paul￿ s was promptly returned by their lifter￿
the churchwarden then told her not to deposit babies at same place too often. Her salary
for lifting was £3 a year. Another nurse, Joan Newenham, started out getting paid 4s 9d
for every baby she lifted. This was subsequently switched to an annual salary of £4 10s.
Illegitimacy placed a great strain on the church￿ s or state￿ s resources. They may be called
upon to provide poor relief to an unwed mother who kept her illegitimate children. They had
to support the foundling hospitals and workhouses that received the abandoned babies, and
provide the children with the necessary food, clothing, wetnursing, etc. And, then there was
the cost of foster parents, orphanages, and workhouses for the lucky children who survived.
Suppose that today￿ s church or state o¢ cials desire to minimize the current number of out-
of-wedlock births. To do this, assume that they embark on a program to encourage parents
to socialize their children about the perils of premarital sex. Speci￿cally, let an old couple
feel opprobrium in the amount O(r) = ￿r1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), with 0 < ￿ < 1, should their daughter
experience an out-of-wedlock birth, where r is the level of activity undertaken by the state
or church to generate this stigma. Suppose that the church or state faces the cost function
￿r￿+1=(￿ + 1), with ￿, ￿ > 1. Clearly, the church and state may pursue other ideals, such as
the well-being of society. The virtue of the speci￿c objective adopted here is its simplicity.


















￿+1=(￿ + 1)g; P(2)
36subject to



































= (1 + ￿I)V1((1 + ￿I)s), for all I and y
0
f, (14)





and r0. The constraint is the ￿rst-order condition that parents
solve this period to determine s. Note the presence of the opprobrium that they will feel
if their daughter has an out-of-wedlock birth. For simplicity, in this formulation the church
neglects the secondary impact that its actions may have on the marriage market through





and the church￿ s level of activity tomorrow, r0. These
channels are complicated to analyze. Essentially, the church would have to take into account
how its current activity will in￿ uence the whole time path of the economy from today on.22
So, view the extension here as an illustrative example of how the church or state might be
incorporated into the analysis.
Minimizing gives the ￿rst-order condition



































22To understand the problem note that church￿ s actions today will a⁄ect tomorrow￿ s type distributions
F0(y0
f;0) and F0(y0













through the matching process described by (8). Characterizing
the impact of F0 on Pf0 involves perturbing a function with respect to a function. The church￿ s constraint
(14) may be e⁄ected. Also, there will be an impact on what the church will do tomorrow, as is immediate
by updating the church￿ s problem P(2). Additionally, in P(2) observe that ￿(s;y0
f) = 1 ￿ Ph ￿
hf￿￿
, where











































. Last, the churches action￿ s tomorrow will cause a shift in F00(y00
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and F00(y00


































+ O(r)] ￿ (1 + ￿I)
2 V11((1 + ￿I)s) < 0:
Note that church internalizes the impact that its action, r, has on parental decision making
s, as (15) makes clear. By pressuring parents it can increase the amount of socialization that
they will undertake. The church or state is solving a static Ramsey-style problem.
The experiment conducted for the baseline model is now rerun while incorporating the
Ramsey problem solved by the church. To do this, the selection for the parameters values
governing the opprobrium function is ￿ = 0:2 and ￿ = 0:4. Next, for the cost function set
￿ = 7:0 and ￿ = 1:0. Last, the odds of safe sex are presumed to increase to 95%, which is
higher than assumed before. Figure 13 shows the upshot. Overtime socialization by both
the church and parents decline as premarital sex becomes safer. Note that a hump-shaped
pattern in out-of-wedlock births emerges when the failure rate for contraception becomes
low enough. This is in accord with Lemma 10. The downturn in births now occurs because
after some date the negative impact that technological progress has on out-of-wedlock births
begins to exceed the positive e⁄ect resulting from the fact that more people are engaging in
premarital sex.23
The historical record supports the idea of lower activity in modern times by the state
and churches to reduce premarital sex. Most of the legal restrictions on illegitimate children
started to be erased in the 1960s. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968), stated that the rights of a child to sue on a deceased parent￿ s behalf may not be
denied merely because a person is the illegitimate child of the deceased. The Supreme Court
understood that such limitation would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
23Consider the following alternative extension that injects cultural dynamics into the analysis. Let r evolve
according to
r = (1 ￿ ￿)s + ￿r￿1;










Here the opprobrium, O(r), that parents feel when their child has an out-of-wedlock birth will adjust slowly
over time to any new economic circumstances. Social attitudes will have a capital aspect to them. In this
spirit, FernÆndez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) develop a model where men￿ s preferences toward female labor-
force participation change slowly over time in response to an increase in the fraction of working mothers
in the population (promoting further participation). In their work there are no interested parties, such as
churches, states or parents, trying to in￿ uence this evolution.











































































Figure 13: Socialization by church and parents
Amendment. Moreover, the decision established that states were not permitted to classify
in a way that constitutes ￿invidious discrimination against a particular class.￿This idea of
￿invidious discrimination￿was developed in a number of subsequent decisions that eliminated
nearly all legal consequences of illegitimacy in the U.S. (although a few survive, mostly related
with immigration status). Similar legal changes equalizing the legal rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children spread quickly in Western European countries, including England (1969
and 1989), France (1972 and 2001), Germany (1969 and 1997), Italy (1975), and Spain (1981).
In 2005, France went as far as removing the very same concept of illegitimacy from its civil
code.
Churches, particularly mainline protestant ones, also de-emphasized the existing strict
provisions against premarital sex. In a famous example, the Episcopal Bishop of Newark, John
Shelby Strong (a best-seller author of Christian books), called in 1987 for the recognition and
blessing of non-marital relations. In Europe, the movement was even stronger. For instance,
the German Protestant Church published in 1971 a Memorandum on Questions of Sexual
Ethics that implied that couples who intended to marry could decide for themselves whether
premarital sex was acceptable￿ Herzog (2007).
3910. Conclusions
Engaging in a premarital conjugal relationship in yesteryear was a perilous activity for a young
woman. The odds of becoming pregnant were high, given the primitive state of contraception.
The economic consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth were dire for a young woman. Being
born in or out of wedlock could be the di⁄erence between life or death for a child. Just like
today young adults would have weighed the cost and bene￿t of engaging in premarital sex.
The cost would have been lower for women stuck at the bottom of the social economic scale,
so they would have been more inclined to participate. To tip the scale against premarital
sex, parents, churches, etc. socialized children to possess a set of sexual mores aimed at
stigmatizing sex. Parents at the lower end of the social economic scale would have less
incentive to engage in such practice. With the passage of time contraception become more
e¢ cient and the costs of premarital sex consequently declined. This changed the cost and
bene￿t calculation for young adults so that they would be more likely to participate in sexual
activity. It also reduced the need for socialization by parents, or the church and state, which
would also spur promiscuity. This is an example of culture following technological progress.
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11. Appendix
11.1. Data Sources
￿ Figure 1. The data on attitudes by women toward premarital sex are displayed in
Figure 2 in Harding and Jencks (2003) and was kindly supplied by the authors. The
numbers on the fraction of teenage girls who have experienced premarital sex by age 19
are taken from Greenwood and Guner (forth.), which contains information about the
source.
￿ Figure 2. See Greenwood and Guner (forth.) for information on how the failure rates
are constructed. The data on out-of-wedlock births for teenage girls is derived as
follows. The data for 1960-2000 is taken from Greenwood and Guner (forth.). For
the 1972-2000 period it sums births to unmarried teenagers, all abortions to teenagers,
and miscarriages (calculated as 20% of births plus 10% of abortions). For the 1960-
1971 period it estimates the total number pregnancies by simply assuming that the
(abortions + miscarriages)/(out-of-wedlock births) ratio took the same value as it did
in 1972. For 1920, 1930, 1940 and 1950-1960 the series from Greenwood and Guner
(forth.) is extended using the same procedure. The data on out-of-wedlock births for
1940 and 1950-1960 is from Ventura, Mathews and Hamilton (2001). For 1920 and 1930,
using Bachu￿ s (1999) estimates for 1930-1934, out-of-wedlock births are calculated as
14.5% of total births to teenagers. Total births to teenagers are from Heuser (1976).
￿ Figure 3. For the period 1580-1837 the data on out-of-wedlock births for all women
is taken from Wrigley et al (1997, p. 224). For the period 1842-2005 the source is
Ermisch (2006, Figure 1). Wrigley and Scho￿eld (1981, p 230) provide data on the
45gross reproduction rate for 1541-1871. The data for 1876-2000 came from UK National
Statistics.
￿ Figure 5. The data on premarital sex is calculated from the 2002 National Survey of
Family Growth (Division of Vital Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics) as
the fraction of women between ages 20 and 44 who had premarital sex before age 19.
￿ Figure 6. The underlying time-use data is taken from Aguiar and Hurst (2007). The
￿gure plots the sum of educational and recreational childcare, normalized by 112 (total
non-sleeping time per week).
￿ Figure 8 (and the facts on attitudes cited in the Introduction). Source: National Survey
of Family Growth.
11.2. Extra Sources for the Literature Cited
￿ Random House Webster￿ s Quotationary, (1999, p. 784)
￿ France, Fuchs (1984, p.p. 17-22, p. 100, Table 3.3a, Table 3.11)
￿ America, Godbeer (2002, p. 35, p. 87, p. 98, p. 230)
￿ England, MacFarlane in Laslett et al (1980, p. 73) and Stone (1977, p. 635, p. 637)
￿ Scotland, Smout in Laslett et al (1980, p. 200, p. 202, p. 204, pp. 214-216)
11.3. Outline of an algorithm to compute a steady-state solution for the model
1. Make a guess for Af(y0;I0), L(y0
f;y0
m;I0), and the joint distribution for females over
(y0
f;I0) denoted by F.
2. With the guess for F and L, solve the matching process (8) to obtain P f(y0
mjy0
f;I0).
Then, compute a solution for s of the form s = S(y0;I) using Af and P f￿ see (9). The
distribution F can then be updated using (11).
3. Next, calculate M￿(yf;ym;I;y0
f), using (5) and Af;P f, and S. From this a revised
solution for Af can be obtained￿ see (6). A similar computation can be done for L￿
see (7). The new solutions for Af and L will depend upon the assumed process for
matching, since one needs to know the conditional distribution P f for the integration.
4. Continue until Af and F converge.
4611.4. Outline of an algorithm to compute the transitional dynamics for the model
Denote the initial time period by 1 and suppose that the model converges to the new steady
state by period T.
1. Make an initial guess for the time path of A
f







F 1 and ￿ ! s 1. For period T use the steady-state values for A
f
T,
LT, FT and sT. Note that F1 is an initial condition.












t , Ft, and st
starting at period 1 and moving down the path to period T ￿1 in the following manner:
1. For each period t solve the matching process (8) to obtain P
f
t+1. To do this, use






F j. Next, compute st using






j. This is used in the ￿1;t
term. The solution for P
f
t+1 just obtained is also used.
2. Once st has been computed for period t then calculate the implied solutions for
A
f
t, Lt and Ft. The solution for A
f
t will involve P
f
t+1, which has already been
computed. The formula for Ft+1 is
Ft+1(y
0


















3. Use the new computed values for A
f
t , Lt, Ft, and st for t = 2;:::;T ￿ 1 to revise the








F j+1 and ￿ ! s j+1.












F j+1;￿ ! s j+1).
1. If it is below some prescribed tolerance level, then stop.
2. If not, then go back to Step 2.
11.5. Steady-State Distribution when yf is Independent over Generations
The goal is to derive equation (12). Suppose that the economy is in a steady state. Let b
represent the fraction of girls that are born out of wedlock. Then, bP
y
(y0
f) is the number of
47young girls that are born out of wedlock with a productivity level less than or equal to y0
f.
In a steady state the number of out-of-wedlock births, b, will satisfy

























This formula takes into account that parents with out-of-wedlock children will socialize their
children di⁄erently than ones with them. The ￿rst term gives the number of unmarried girls
experiencing a pregnancy arising from families without out-of-wedlock children, while the
































This formula simpli￿es to (12) when S is not a function of I.
Recall that F represents the joint distribution for females over (yf;I). In a steady state
this distribution will be given by
F(y
0





















The ￿rst term in (11) gives the number of young girls with a productivity level less than y0
f,
who came from a family without out-of-wedlock births, that will in turn experience an out-
of-wedlock birth. The second term gives the number of young girls with a productivity level
less than y0
f, and who were born in a family with out-of-wedlock births, that will experience
an out-of-wedlock birth.
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